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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A.

Introduction

Upon seizing control of Phnom Penh in 1975, the Khmer Rouge sought to transform
Cambodia into a pure ‘Khmer nation’ by eliminating not only all religious, ethnic, racial and
national groups, but also Cambodians who had connections to any of these groups. While all
ethnic and racial minorities were marked for elimination, the fervor with which the Khmer
Rouge targeted the Vietnamese and Cambodians who had Vietnamese connections was the most
intense. This memorandum will discuss using the elimination of Cambodian citizens who were
identified as Vietnamese sympathizers between 1975 and 1979 as grounds for charging the
Khmer Rouge leaders with genocide of the Vietnamese. Specifically, this memorandum will first
discuss using the elimination of Cambodian citizens marked as Vietnamese sympathizers as a
method for establishing direct and circumstantial evidence of specific intent of the Khmer Rouge
leaders to destroy the Vietnamese national group. This memorandum will then discuss using the
elimination of Vietnamese sympathizers as a method for satisfying the physical elements of
genocide as stated in Article II (b), (c), and (d) of the Genocide Convention. This memorandum
will analyze the elimination of Cambodian citizens identified as Vietnamese sympathizers in
light of past tribunals that have dealt with genocide, namely Nuremburg, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) as well as the relevant statutes of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC), the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Genocide Convention.

“Can the systematic elimination of Cambodian citizens identified as Vietnamese sympathizers
be grounds for charging the Khmer Rouge with genocide of the Vietnamese national group?”


1
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B.

Summary of Conclusions
1.

The elimination of Cambodian citizens identified as Vietnamese
sympathizers may be used to establish specific intent of the Khmer
Rouge leaders to destroy the Vietnamese national group.

The mens rea element of genocide requires the accused to possess specific intent or dolus
specialis. The mens rea of genocide is its distinguishing factor, separating it from other serious
international crimes. Since the specific intent requirement carries an extremely high burden of
proof, it is often the most difficult element of genocide to establish. While prosecutors in the ad
hoc Tribunals have been successful in widening the scope of interpretation of genocide in other
areas, courts in these tribunals have generally upheld the demanding threshold of proof for this
element of genocide. The fact that the Khmer Rouge completely eradicated the Vietnamese from
Cambodia is not necessarily enough to satisfy the specific intent requirement of genocide. The
systematic campaign of the Khmer Rouge to eliminate Cambodian citizens who had connections
with the Vietnamese and were, therefore, ‘class enemies,’ provides additional and crucial
evidence of the specific intent of Khmer Rouge leaders to destroy the Vietnamese national
group.

a.

The elimination of Cambodian citizens identified as
Vietnamese sympathizers may be used as direct evidence of the
specific intent of Khmer Rouge leaders to destroy the
Vietnamese national group.

It is widely accepted that genocide cannot occur without the existence of a state plan or
policy and that convictions are highly unlikely absent proof of such a plan. While ad hoc
Tribunal jurisprudence has held that genocide may be committed in the absence of a state plan or
2
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policy, it has also held that it can offer compelling direct evidence of the specific genocidal
intent of the accused. Statements or speeches of the accused can also provide direct evidence of
the specific intent. The announced policy of the Khmer Rouge to eliminate not only all
Vietnamese but all Cambodians who possessed ties to the Vietnamese provides direct evidence
of specific genocidal intent of the Khmer Rouge leaders.
b.

The elimination of Cambodian citizens identified as
Vietnamese sympathizers can be used as circumstantial
evidence of the specific intent of Khmer Rouge leaders to
destroy the Vietnamese national group.

It is well-established in modern international criminal jurisprudence that specific
genocidal intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as general political doctrines,
repetition of destructive acts and other forms of violence repeatedly directed at the same group of
people. The ICTY has held that while cultural destruction does not qualify as genocide per se, if
the cultural identities of a protected group are targeted for destruction along with the group itself,
cultural destruction may be used to establish specific intent. Since the Khmer Rouge had an
announced policy to eliminate all traces of foreign influence, the elimination of Cambodians who
spoke Vietnamese or had Vietnamese friends or family members should qualify as cultural
destruction of the Vietnamese and serve as circumstantial evidence of specific intent of the
Khmer Rouge leaders.

2.

There does not appear to be an accepted defense within international
criminal law that can be used to negate the specific intent of the
Khmer Rouge leaders.

Of the several special defenses in international law which can be used to negate specific
intent of the accused, none seem to apply to the specific intent of the Khmer Rouge to destroy
3
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the Vietnamese national group. In addition to the special defenses available for the crime of
genocide, the ICTY and the ICTR have considered other sets of circumstances where the specific
intent of the accused is being challenged through the existence of a personal motive that is not
genocidal. The travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention indicates that motives of the
accused play no role in determining whether or not genocide has been committed. Jurisprudence
from the ad hoc Tribunals establish that while personal motives of the accused can exist in
conjunction with specific genocidal intent, motive and specific genocidal intent should generally
be distinguished. Given the fact that the Khmer Rouge sought not only to eliminate the
Vietnamese, but also the Cambodians who were identified as Vietnamese sympathizers, it is
unlikely that a defense successful in establishing alternate personal motives of the Khmer Rouge
would carry enough weight to negate the specific genocidal intent of the Khmer Rouge.
3.

The elimination Cambodian citizens identified as Vietnamese sympathizers
should be admissible as direct and circumstantial evidence of specific intent
of the Khmer Rouge leaders to destroy the Vietnamese national group.

Since there is no specific standard governing the admissibility of evidence in
international criminal proceedings, international courts have adopted a liberal approach in
determining what evidence is admissible. This liberal approach has left international courts with
wide discretion in determining what information is admissible as evidence, the general standard
being that any information with relevance and probative value may be admitted. Based on this
broad scope of discretion that has been exercised by past and present international criminal
courts, it is likely that the elimination of Cambodian citizens identified as Vietnamese
sympathizers will be admissible as direct and circumstantial evidence of specific intent of the
Khmer Rouge to destroy the Vietnamese national group.
4
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4.

The elimination of Cambodian citizens identified as Vietnamese
sympathizers may be used to establish that the Khmer Rouge leaders
committed genocide of the Vietnamese by causing serious mental harm.

While the text of the Genocide Convention has remained unchanged, case law from the
ad hoc Tribunals indicates a trend in applying expansive interpretations to the physical elements
of genocide. The elimination of Cambodians identified as Vietnamese sympathizers may be used
to satisfy the physical element of genocide in Article II (b) of the Genocide Convention which
states that genocide may be committed by “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group.” Both the ICTY and the ICTR have applied liberal interpretations to this element,
providing numerous factors that may cause bodily or mental harm to rise to the level of
genocide. Since most of the Vietnamese who remained in Cambodia after 1975 did so because
their spouses were Cambodian, it is likely that many were in situations where they witnessed the
torture, imprisonment or execution of a spouse or even a child. Case law in both the ICTY and
the ICTR has established that mental harm rises to the level of genocide in circumstances similar
to what the Vietnamese endured under the Khmer Rouge.
5.

The elimination of Cambodian citizens identified as Vietnamese
sympathizers may be used to establish that Khmer Rouge leaders committed
genocide of the Vietnamese by deliberately inflicting conditions of life
calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Vietnamese.

Article II (c) of the Genocide Convention states that genocide may be committed by
“deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part.” While the Genocide Convention is silent as to the acts which
may cause the conditions of life it refers to, jurisprudence from both of the ad hoc Tribunals
clearly establish that prison or concentration camps are at least one method of satisfying this
5
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element. In addition to jurisprudence from the ad hoc Tribunals, the Rome Statute also applies a
broad method of interpretation to this element. In eliminating the group of Cambodians who had
connections with the Vietnamese and, therefore, stood in a better position to aid the Vietnamese
compared to other Cambodians, the Khmer Rouge deliberately created conditions of life for the
Vietnamese that were calculated to bring about their physical destruction. Furthermore, the Tuol
Sleng or S-21 interrogation and torture center where individuals who were suspected of being
‘class enemies’ or ‘Vietnamese agents’ were tortured and executed is similar to the concentration
and prison camps referred to by the ad hoc Tribunals.
6.

The elimination of Cambodian citizens identified as Vietnamese
sympathizers may be used to establish that Khmer Rouge leaders committed
genocide of the Vietnamese by imposing measures which were intended to
prevent births within the group.

Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention states that genocide may be committed by
imposing measures intended to prevent births within a protected group. Like Article II (b) and
(c), II (d) is silent as to what acts used to prevent births may rise to the level of genocide. Unlike
Article II (b) and (c), however, II (d) does not require the acts to be calculated with the intent to
destroy the protected group in whole or in part. Accordingly, the ad hoc Tribunals of the ICTY
and ICTR have applied broad methods of interpretation to this element, both holding that rape
and other forms of sexual violence such as sexual mutilation are acts which may satisfy this
element. Since the majority of the Vietnamese who remained in Cambodia after 1975 were likely
the spouses of Cambodian citizens, the elimination of these Cambodians necessarily prevented
the remaining Vietnamese from having children. Additionally, women who were brought to
interrogation centers like S-21 were often subjected to sexual mutilation as a form of torture.

6
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II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
When the Khmer Rouge took control of Phnom Penh in April of 1975, it declared its

victory as the end of 2,000 years of oppression of the Khmer peasantry by foreign and class
enemies, the ultimate goal being to bring Cambodia back to ‘year zero’ by transforming
Cambodia into a purely homogenized society, void of any social, ethnic or class divisions.2
Upon taking control of Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge, believing itself to be at war with
neighboring countries Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, immediately outlawed the existence of all
ethnic and religious minorities and anyone else considered a class enemy. 3 In 1975, there were
approximately 160,000 Vietnamese living in Cambodia. In the months following the fall of
Phnom Penh, up to 150,000 Vietnamese were expelled from Cambodia; most of those who
remained were likely the spouses of Cambodian citizens. 4
While the Khmer Rouge marked all ethnic, religious and national minorities as class
enemies, the Vietnamese who remained in Cambodia after 1975 suffered the worst fate.5 It is
estimated that 100% of the 10,000-20,000 Vietnamese who were not initially expelled from
Cambodia were murdered by the Khmer Rouge.6 Although the initial efforts of the Khmer Rouge

2

Howard Ball, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
EXPERIENCE at 101 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
3

Craig Etcheson, AFTER THE KILLING FIELDS: LESSONS FROM THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE at 8.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
4

Ben Kiernan, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER AND GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER THE
KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79 at 296 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
5

Ben Kiernan, The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia,
1975-79, and East Timor, 1975-80, 35 CRITICAL ASIAN STUDIES 585 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
6

Id.
7
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were focused on expelling the Vietnamese from Cambodia, the policies implemented in 1976
shifted the goal of the regime from expulsion to annihilation.7 The atrocities committed against
the Vietnamese between 1975 and 1979 were results not of isolated actions of individual
officials, but of the calculated state policies put in place by Khmer Rouge leaders.8 Ultimately, it
was the increasingly genocidal campaign against the Vietnamese which marked the beginning of
the end for the Khmer Rouge; the repeated attacks on Vietnamese villages along the Cambodian
border prompted an invasion by Vietnam. On December 25, 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia
and within two weeks had defeated the Khmer Rouge and “liberated” Cambodia.9

III.

LEGAL DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A.

Defining and Codifying Genocide

While the crime of genocide had not yet been codified in the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremburg (IMT), the term was introduced in the IMT indictment along
with crimes of war and crimes against humanity.10 The atrocities of WWII were officially

7

Kiernan,THE POL POT REGIME at 296-297 n.151, supra note 4 (By the middle of 1976,
Vietnamese were forbidden to leave Cambodia and a nationwide campaign to eliminate the
Vietnamese, their spouses and Khmer born in Vietnam, commenced). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
8

Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 52/135,U.N. A/53/850, S/1999/231, 16 March 1999. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 3].
9

Etcheson, AFTER THE KILLING FIELDS at 8 supra note 3[Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 33].
10

David L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the
International Criminal Tribunals, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 231, 249. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 46].
8
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adjudicated under the definition of crimes against humanity, with the crime of genocide not
officially introduced as a form of a crime against humanity until 1948.11 On December 9, 1948,
the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. The Convention allows states to prevent and punish genocidal acts and
contemplates both domestic and international jurisdiction over the crime.12 Article II of the
Convention defines genocide as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.13
The ad hoc Tribunals of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Rome Statute of the
ICC, and the ECCC all use the language of Article II in their definitions of genocide in their
respective statutes.14

William A. Schabas, THE ‘ODIOUS SCOURGE’: EVOLVING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CRIME OF
GENOCIDE, paper presented at ‘Ultimate Crime, Ultimate Challenge, Human Rights and
Genocide’ International Conference, Yerevan, Armenia, 20-21 April 2005 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
11

12

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
adopted by Res.260(III) A of the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9, 1948.
(Genocide Convention). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
13

Id.
9
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The Rome Statute which provides for an international court of general jurisdiction,
codifies serious international crimes and their individual elements.15 While the Rome Statute is
not explicitly stated as a direct source of law in the ECCC statute, the Statute extends universal
jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, making its articles relating to
genocide relevant to the ECCC.16 The Statute defines the mens rea of genocide, stating that,
“unless otherwise provided,” criminal responsibility will attach to genocide if the defendant
possessed “intent and knowledge.” 17 Intent is established under the Rome Statute when the
accused means to engage in the conduct and means to cause that consequence or is aware that it
will occur in the ordinary course of events 18 and knowledge established by an awareness that a
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.19
The ECCC, which resolves to punish ‘those most responsible’ for the crimes committed
between 1975 and 1979, defines genocide by repeating the language of the Genocide Convention
and the Rome Statute and extends jurisdiction to cover violations of the Genocide Convention
14

See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, amended as promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tabs 9, 10, 5 and 2].
15

See Rome Statute at art.1 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

16

See id. at art. 5 (Cambodia is a signatory to the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
17

Id. at art. 30(1) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

18

See id. at art. 30(2) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

19

See id. at art. 30(3) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
10

Adrienne Cavender
International War Crimes Lab
Fall 2009

and sets forth the necessary elements of the crime.20 While there are minor discrepancies
between the ECCC Statute and the Genocide Convention, the ECCC’s mens rea requirement and
the two physical elements discussed in this memorandum are repeated in relevant part from the
text of the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute. 21
B.

The Mens Rea of Genocide

While there are several modes of conduct which can fulfill the actus reus element of
genocide, there is only one way to satisfy the mens rea of genocide.22 Specific intent acts as the
“constitutive element” of genocide and is what distinguishes it from other serious international
crimes.23 The first sentence of Article II of the Convention states that genocide is committed with
the ‘intent’ to destroy in whole or in part one of the protected groups, requiring the accused to
possess specific intent or dolus specialis, and requiring prosecutors to go beyond proving that the
perpetrator merely meant to participate in the crime or meant to cause the outcome.24 Prosecutors
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted with specific intent to destroy
members of a protected group because they were members of that group.25 Defense counsel in

20

See ECCC statute supra note 14 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

21

See id. at art. 4 (The ECCC statute does not include direct or public incitement as a punishable
act). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
22

See International Law Commission's 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security
of Mankind. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
23

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ¶ 498, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment of 2 September 1998 (noting the intent
to destroy a protected group as genocide’s distinguishing factor). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 14].
24

William A. Schabas, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES at 214.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
25

Id. at 222 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
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genocide trials often focus on denying the requisite mens rea of the accused rather than the actus
reus elements of genocide. Acquittals in genocide trials are typically entered when the specific
intent of the accused to destroy the protected group has not been established by the prosecution.26
Accordingly, specific intent is the most difficult element of genocide to prove and is often the
deciding factor in genocide trials.27
1.

The Systematic Elimination of Cambodian Citizens Identified as
Vietnamese Sympathizers as a way to establish Specific Intent.

In establishing specific intent for the crime of genocide, the prosecution must show not
that a perpetrator intended to destroy members of a protected group, but that he or she intended
to cause the harmful results of destroying the protected group in whole or in part.28 The Rome
Statute provides for satisfaction of the mens rea element of genocide through intent and
knowledge, unless otherwise provided, leaving the door open for tribunals to determine the
requisite mental state for genocide in their respective statutes. 29 While there is still some debate
surrounding the inclusion of the mental state of “knowledge,” case law from the ad hoc
Tribunals indicates that this has not been accepted.30

26

John Quigley, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS at 90
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38].
27

Schabas, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 207 supra note 24 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
28

Id. at 222 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].

29

Rome Statute at art. 30(1) supra note 14 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

See Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 231 at 264 supra note 11
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
30
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Both the ICTY and the ICTR have rejected attempts by prosecutors to broaden the
interpretation of specific intent to include the mental states of knowledge, recklessness and
negligence; however, they have held that specific intent can be established through direct or
circumstantial evidence. 31 In 1999, the UN Group of Experts, in recommending that the
remaining leaders of Democratic Kampuchea be charged with genocide and crimes against
humanity, stated that the specific intent of the remaining leaders “has support in direct and
indirect evidence, including Khmer Rouge statements, eyewitness accounts and the nature and
numbers of victims, both in absolute terms and in proportion to each group’s total population.” 32
a.

The Announced Policy of the Khmer Rouge to Eliminate
Vietnamese Sympathizers Provides Direct Evidence of Specific
Intent of the Khmer Rouge Leaders to Destroy the Vietnamese
National Group.

Direct evidence of specific genocidal intent is the most helpful and critical component in
establishing the requisite mental state of the accused. When direct evidence of specific intent is
available, it typically appears in the form of statements of the accused, either oral or written, or a
state plan or policy regarding the physical destruction of a group. While the drafters of the
Genocide Convention intentionally left out a provision requiring a state plan or policy to exist,33

31

Prosecutor v. Krstic, ¶ 569, IT-98-33-T, Judgment of 2 August 2001 (the Trial Chamber
rejected the prosecution’s argument that specific intent was established when the accused knew
his acts were destroying or were likely to destroy the protected group in whole or in part, holding
that genocide “encompasses only acts committed with the goal of destroying all or part of a
group.”); Akayesu at ¶ 478 supra note 23 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tabs 25
and 14].
32

Report of the U.N. Group of Experts, supra note 10 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 3].
33

U.N. ECOSOCOR, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 4th mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/AC.25/SR.4 (April 15, 1948) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
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it is generally accepted that genocide cannot be committed without at least some planning and
preparation on behalf of the state and that a conviction is unlikely absent proof of such a plan.34
The very nature of the crime of genocide seems to preclude an individual acting alone from
being able to commit genocide.35 The ICTY has held that while proof of a state policy to destroy
a group is not a necessary element of genocide, it is often the determining factor in establishing
not only specific intent but the actual commission of the crime itself.36 Similarly, the ICTR has
held that proof of existence of a state plan or policy is “strong evidence of the specific intent
requirement,” 37 and that if a state plan is shown to exist, it is not necessary for the accused to
know of every detail of the plan.38 Specific intent can, therefore, be established by showing a
plan of criminal conduct, or a plan of omission, which is intended to bring about the destruction
of a protected group.
Statements and speeches by the accused can also serve as direct evidence of specific
intent.39 The ICTR has held that speech calling on others to kill members of a protected group
can help to prove the specific intent of the accused and should be considered in the context in

34

M. Cherif Bassiouni, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA at 527. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39].
35

Schabas, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 207 supra note 24 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
36

Prosecutor v. Jelisic, ¶ 48, IT-95-10A, Judgment of 5 July 2001 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 18].
37

Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ¶ 276, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment of 21 May 1999.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
38

Id. at ¶ 94. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

39

Schabas, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 222 supra note 24 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
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which the statements were made.40 The ICTR has further held that speech and propaganda of the
accused requires a specific mental state and mobilization of those who will assist in carrying out
a genocidal plan, giving rise to specific genocidal intent.41 An ICTR Trial Chamber found direct
evidence of specific intent of the Hutu attackers as they chased Tutsi refugees singing
“exterminate them; look for them everywhere; kill them; and get it over with, in all the forests.”42
The Khmer Rouge implemented deliberate policies and state plans to eliminate the
Vietnamese and Cambodians who were identified as having Vietnamese connections. It is,
however, important to mention that Khmer Rouge policies regarding the Vietnamese likely did
not become genocidal until at least 1976 when the Vietnamese became prohibited from leaving
Cambodia.43 Similar to the Nazi party in World War II, the initial policies of the Khmer Rouge
were focused on driving the Vietnamese out of Cambodia.44 Also in 1976, Khmer Rouge
officials in the Eastern Zone announced that there were no longer to be “Chams or Chinese or
Vietnamese. Everyone is to join the same, single Khmer nationality.” 45 On April 1, 1977, Pol
Pot issued a “Directive from 870” instructing local officials to “arrest all ethnic Vietnamese, and
40

Akayesu at ¶ 728 supra note 23 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

41

Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gerard Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10-T & ICTR-96-17-T, ¶ 828, 21
February 2003. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
42

Id.

43

Kiernan, THE POL POT REGIME at 296 supra note 4 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 32].
William A. Schabas, Problems of International Codification – Were the Atrocities in
Cambodia and Kosovo Genocide? 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 287, 295. (While the Nazis initially tried
to convince the Jews to leave Germany, the party policy became genocidal in 1942).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
44

45

Kiernan, THE POL POT REGIME at 276 supra note 4 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 32].
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all Khmers who spoke Vietnamese or had Vietnamese friends, and hand them over to state
security forces.” 46 In that same month, a Khmer Rouge official declared in a broadcast over the
national radio system that “[w]e must wipe out the enemy and suppress all stripes of enemy at all
times.” 47 In early 1977, Pol Pot ordered Khmer Rouge officials to prepare for war. Cambodian
forces began launching attacks on Vietnamese villages along the Cambodian border, most of
which had significant ethnic Khmer populations.48 Party rhetoric shifted from focusing on work
and agriculture to talk of conquering the Khmer Krom; Vietnamese and Khmer were described
as “life and death enemies.”49 In preparation for war with Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge began
ordering purges among the various zones, the focus of which was the elimination of Cambodians
with Vietnamese blood or suspected of being “Vietnamese agents.” 50 In the Eastern Zone purges
of 1978, everyone living in this region was declared to have “Khmer bodies, but Vietnamese
heads” 51

46

Id. at 297 (870 was the Communist Party of Kampuchea Center) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
47

Ben Kiernan, Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice, HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW 92 (APRIL-JUNE
2000), citing Khieu Samphan, speech broadcast on Phnom Penh Radio, Apr. 15, 1977, extract in
NEW STATESMAN, May 2, 1980, 675. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 45].
48

Kiernan, THE POL POT REGIME at 361 supra note 4 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 32].
49

Id. at 362 (Khmer Krom were ethnic Khmer living in Vietnam) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 32].
50

Elizabeth Becker, WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER: CAMBODIA AND THE KHMER ROUGE
REVOLUTION at 303 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
51

Gregory Stanton, Blue Scarves and Yellow Stars: Classification and Symbolization in the
Cambodian Genocide (1987) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 49].
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Similar to the genocides committed in WWII Germany, Rwanda, and the former
Yugoslavia, the Khmer Rouge employed the use of anti-Vietnamese rhetoric and classification
systems to further their genocidal goals. Like the defendants in Akayesu and Ntakirutimana,
Khmer Rouge leaders used propaganda and decrees calling for the destruction of the Vietnamese
as a way to mobilize Khmer Rouge cadres to seek out and eliminate the Vietnamese and
Cambodians with Vietnamese connections. The speeches and rhetoric of the Khmer Rouge also
likely encouraged other Cambodians to assist in the genocidal campaign against the Vietnamese
by reporting to the Khmer Rouge anyone suspected of being Vietnamese or having Vietnamese
connections. The ICTR holdings in Akayesu and Ntakirutimana show that the speeches and
rhetoric used in tandem with the elimination of Cambodians identified as Vietnamese
sympathizers can be used as direct evidence of the specific intent of the Khmer Rouge leaders.
Additionally, the holdings of both ad hoc Tribunals as well as generally accepted principles of
the perpetration of genocide clearly suggest the policies put in place by the Khmer Rouge and its
increasingly genocidal rhetoric starting in 1976 qualify as direct evidence of specific genocidal
intent of the Khmer Rouge leaders.
b.

The Systematic Elimination of Cambodians Identified as
Vietnamese Sympathizers Provides Circumstantial Evidence of
Specific Intent of the Khmer Rouge Leaders to Destroy the
Vietnamese National Group.

Case law in both ad hoc Tribunals establishes that when no direct evidence of specific
intent exists, specific intent can be inferred from the general circumstances and context
surrounding the commission of the crime.52 The inference of specific intent, however, must be

52

Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ¶525, ICTR-96-3-T Judgment of 6 December 1999. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
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the only reasonable conclusion from the facts of the case and still requires the prosecution to
prove the existence of specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 53
The ICTR has held that since genocidal intent “is a mental factor which is difficult, even
impossible, to determine . . . [I]t is possible to deduce genocidal intent inherent in a particular act
charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
directed against that same group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender or by
others.” 54 In establishing the relevant circumstances and context surrounding the commission of
the crime, the ICTR considers the number of atrocities and widespread nature in which the
atrocities were committed,55 the systematic selection of individuals for elimination56 and
documents which establish that the accused participated in the crimes.57 Additionally, the ICTR
has found that “intent can be inferred from either words or deeds and may be demonstrated by a
pattern of purposeful action,” and that evidence such as the “physical targeting of the group or
their property; the use of derogatory language toward members of the targeted group; the
methodical way of planning, the systematic manner of killing” should be considered.58
Consistent with the ICTR, the ICTY has held that expression of genocidal intent does not need to

53

Prosecutor v. Brdanin, ¶ 970, IT-99-36-T, Judgment of 1 September 2004; Prosecutor v.
Simba, ¶ 413, ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment of 13 December 2005. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tabs 16 and 32].
54

Akayesu at ¶ 523 supra note 23 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

55

Id.

56

Kayishema and Ruzindana at ¶ 93 supra note 38 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 21].
57

Id. at ¶ 527 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

58

Id. at ¶ 93 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
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be explicit and has noted sources that can lead to an inference of genocidal intent as “the general
political doctrine which gave rise to the acts . . . or the repetition of destructive and
discriminatory acts.” 59
Although the destruction of social, cultural and other unique identities of a protected
group are not themselves encompassed under the definition of genocide,60 if these identities are
targeted for destruction along with the protected group, they may be used to establish specific
intent.61 The destruction of cultural or social aspects of a protected group is important for
evidentiary purposes when the accused believes these actions to destroy the “foundation of the
group.”62 In Krstić, the ICTY Trial Chamber found circumstantial evidence of specific intent
through the destruction of homes and religious buildings and the concealment of mass graves
which prevented “any decent burial in accord with religious and ethnic customs.” 63 Krstić was
convicted of genocide upon the finding that he took deliberate measures to destroy the Bosnian
Muslims in part even though “only the men of military age were systematically massacred.” 64
The scope of the term ‘destroy’ has been successfully expanded to include “acts that involved
cultural and other non-physical forms of group destruction,” provided that it is used to advance

59

Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, ¶ 84, IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Review of
Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, 11 July 1996. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
20].
60

Genocide Convention at art. II supra note 12 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
1].
61

See Krstić at ¶ 580 supra note 31 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].

62

Karadzic and Mladic at ¶ 94 supra note 60 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].

63

Krstić at ¶ 595 supra note 31 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].

64

Id.
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the ultimate goal of the destruction of a protected group.65 The interpretation of specific intent by
the ICTR and the ICTY is applicable in several ways to the elimination of Cambodian citizens
who were Vietnamese sympathizers.
First, case law from both ad hoc Tribunals consistently indicates that the general
circumstances in which atrocities are committed can provide circumstantial evidence of specific
intent of the accused. The systematic and deliberate selection of individuals who were either
Vietnamese or had Vietnamese connections for destruction by the Khmer Rouge falls within the
scope of the Akayesu holding. Additionally, the general political doctrine under which the
Khmer Rouge sought to eliminate the Vietnamese and their sympathizers is consistent with the
holding of the Karadzic and Mladic case.
Second, the expansive interpretation of the term “destroy” is applicable to the elimination
of Cambodian citizens identified as Vietnamese sympathizers. Similar to the Khmer Rouge, the
goal of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) was to create an ethnically homogenous society by
eliminating the non-Serbian population, specifically the Bosnian Muslim group. In order to
realize this goal, the SDP sought to destroy not only the Bosnian Muslims themselves, but
symbols of Muslim culture such as mosques, churches and libraries.66 This broad method of
interpretation which has been expanded to allow the cultural destruction of a protected group as
circumstantial evidence suggests that the campaign to systematically eliminate Cambodians who
spoke Vietnamese or otherwise had Vietnamese connections in conjunction with the elimination
See Krstić at ¶ 580 supra note 32 (noting that the definition of genocide is limited to those acts
seeking the physical destruction of all or part of a group). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 25].
65

66

See Karadzic and Mladic at ¶ 94 supra note 58 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
20].
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of the Vietnamese, could be read as “acts that involved cultural and other non-physical forms of
group destruction.” 67
2.

There does not Appear to be an Accepted Defense in International
Criminal law that can be used to Negate the Specific Intent of Khmer
Rouge leaders to Destroy the Vietnamese National Group.

The specific intent requirement for genocide indicates that it is not a strict liability
offense. An accused may attempt to negate the requisite mens rea of genocide through several
established defenses in international criminal law.68 Since the ECCC statute has no provision
explicitly stating what defenses are available to those charged with genocide, any defense
attempting to negate the specific intent requirement will have to be done through a special
defense available to genocide and within the contours of the Rome Statute and previous case
law.69 None of the special defenses available to negate the mens rea of genocide seem to be
applicable to the Khmer Rouge leaders who sought to destroy Vietnamese. The special defenses
are as follows: head of state immunity, superior orders defense, self defense, duress or
compulsion defense, mistake of law and mistake of fact defense, military necessity defense,
intoxication defense, and the insanity defense.70

Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-33-A, ¶ 28-29, Judgment of 19 April 2004 (by eliminating the
captured Bosnian Muslim men, the Serb forces intentionally contributed to the destruction of the
Bosnian Muslim population as a whole). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
67

68

Prosecutor v. Kaelijeli, ¶ 153, ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment of 1 December 2003[Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
69

See Rome Statute at art. 31 supra note 14 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

70

See Schabas, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 314-344 supra note 24 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
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The ECCC statute specifically states that the head of state immunity and the superior
orders defenses cannot be used by an accused.71 Self-defense is clearly invalid because the
Khmer Rouge leaders were never under attack from the Vietnamese and Cambodian individuals
they were seeking to destroy. In the unlikely event that this defense is raised claiming that since
the Khmer Rouge leaders may have actually believed they were under constant attack from the
Vietnamese they acted accordingly, it would almost certainly fail. Self-defense has to be
exercised with proportionate force and it seems impossible to reconcile the murder of almost
20,000 Vietnamese and an unknown number of Cambodians who had Vietnamese connections
with that of a perceived threat.72 The duress or compulsion defense would also fail because of the
language in the ECCC statute which resolves to only bring ‘those most responsible’ to trial.73
The Khmer Rouge leaders who ordered and oversaw the elimination of the Vietnamese and
Cambodians with Vietnamese connections were more likely in the position of causing duress in
other, less authoritative Khmer Rouge members. The mistake of law and mistake of fact defense
if raised on ex-post facto related ground should fail because the prohibition of genocide was a
part of customary international law in 1975 when the Khmer Rouge came to power. The military
necessity defense should fail on the same grounds as self-defense as a proportionate response is

71

See ECCC Statute at art. 29 supra note 14 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

72

Schabas, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 337 supra note 24 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
73

See ECCC Statute at art. 1 supra note 14 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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required and can only apply if there has been a breach of international law by a military
opponent.74 Intoxication is clearly inapplicable and is rarely raised in genocide cases.
To prevail on an insanity defense, defendants would have to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Khmer Rouge leaders who planned the elimination of the Vietnamese lacked the
capacity to control their conduct and did not have the ability to conform to or appreciate the
laws.75 The systematic nature in which the Khmer Rouge leaders sought to eliminate the
Vietnamese and the Cambodians who had connections to the Vietnamese establishes that the
Khmer Rouge leaders were very much in control of their conduct. The deliberate and complete
overhaul of Cambodian law, culture, customs and society in 1975 shows that the Khmer Rouge
leaders were more than capable of recognizing and appreciating laws in place at that time.
The ad hoc Tribunals have examined other circumstances where the specific intent of an
accused was challenged. The travaux preparatoires of the Convention indicates that motive
behind a certain act does not factor into determining whether or not the accused has committed
genocide.76 However, the nature of the dolus specialis requirement seems to suggest that motives
behind committing acts that appear to be genocide are relevant if the motives result in acts by the

74

Schabas, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 341 supra note 24 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
75

Rome Statute at art. 31 supra note 14 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

76

See Summary Records of the Meetings of the 6th Committee of the General Assembly, 21
September – 10 December 1948 (“travaux préparatoires” of the Genocide Convention) (the term
‘deliberate’ was removed from the Committee draft). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 7].
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accused which are inconsistent with the intent to commit genocide.77 Premeditation is generally
not required, but the specific intent of the accused must have been formed at some point before
the commission of the crime.78 While proof of premeditation is not required since all of the
underlying actus reus elements of genocide involve premeditation, it may act as an aggravating
factor during the sentencing phase. 79
Jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR has contemplated the use of personal motive as a
way to negate specific genocidal intent, and has held that the existence of a personal motive
“does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to commit genocide.” 80
Additionally, while courts in the ad hoc Tribunals have held that personal motive can exist
concurrently with the requisite specific intent, they have noted the importance of distinguishing
personal motive from specific genocidal intent.81 Although the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the
Jelisic case recognized that specific intent can exist concurrently with personal motives, the
Appeals Chamber refused to overturn a genocide acquittal from the Trial Chamber.82 Goran
Jelisic, who called himself the ‘Serbian Adolph,’ stated that he “hated all Muslim women,

77

See Ralph Henham and Paul Behrens, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL,
COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS at 131. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 41].
78

See Kayishema and Ruzindana at ¶ 91 supra note 38 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 21].
79

Prosecutor v. Serushago, ¶ 15, ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence of 5 February 1999 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 29]
80

Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ¶ 161, ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment of 1 June 2001;
Jelisic at ¶ 49 supra note 36 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tabs 22 and 18].
81

Jelisic at ¶ 49 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].

82

Id. at ¶ 62 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
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wanted to sterilize them all in order to prevent an increase in the number of Muslims, but before
killing them wanted to start with the men in order to prevent any proliferation.” 83 The Appeals
Chamber upheld the acquittal which held that since he allowed some Muslims to live, he killed
arbitrarily rather than with the required specific genocidal intent.84 The line of reasoning
employed by the Jelisic court regarding motive and specific intent has been reversed by
subsequent holdings in the ICTY 85 and appears to be the exception rather than the rule when
dealing with motive and specific intent.
The ICTR has rejected the claim that specific intent can be negated by personal motives
such as systematically killing members of a protected group for economic gain,86 or as a
‘spontaneous’ reaction to outside circumstances.87 The ICTR has also rejected the notion that a
single inconsistent and contradictory act carries significant weight in determining whether the
accused possessed the required mens rea to commit genocide, 88 consistently holding that

83

Id.

84

Id. at ¶ 64 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].

85

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, ¶ 102, IT-97-25-A, Judgment of 17 September 2003; Brdanin at ¶ 696
supra note 54 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tabs 24 and 16].
86

Kayishema and Ruzindana at ¶ 161 supra note 80 (Ruzindana claimed he killed members of
the Tutsi group because he wanted to eliminate business competition, not because he wanted to
destroy the Tutsi group in whole or in part). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
87

Kaelijeli at ¶ 158 supra note 69 (Kajelijeli claimed he killed members of the Tutsi group as
part of a reaction to the death of Rwanda’s President). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 19].
88

Kayishema and Ruzindana at ¶ 148 supra note 80 (The court, not persuaded by claims that
since he gave an order to take injured Tutsi children to the hospital he did not possess specific
genocidal intent, convicted Kayishema of genocide). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 23].
25

Adrienne Cavender
International War Crimes Lab
Fall 2009

assistance to some members of a protected group is not enough to negate specific intent.89
Regardless of why they occurred, allowing for inconsistent and contradictory acts to negate the
existence of specific intent would violate the language in the Genocide Convention which
explicitly states that genocide may be committed with the intent to destroy only part of a
protected group.90
Given Cambodia’s history of hostile political relations with Vietnam and the fact that the
ultimate goal of the Khmer Rouge was to bring Cambodia back to ‘year zero,’ the defense may
argue that the intent of the Khmer Rouge leaders was revolutionary rather than genocidal, citing
to the initial efforts of the Khmer Rouge to forcibly assimilate everyone into Khmers. The
defense may also cite to the invasion by Vietnam in 1979 to prove that the Khmer Rouge
targeted the Vietnamese and their sympathizers for reasons other than their desire to destroy the
Vietnamese national group in whole or in part. However, given the clear trend from the ad hoc
Tribunals and the travaux preparatoires, it is unlikely that either of these assertions would carry
enough weight to effectively negate the specific intent of the Khmer Rouge leaders.
3.

The Elimination of Cambodian Citizens Identified as Vietnamese
Sympathizers Should be Admissible as Direct or Circumstantial
Evidence of Specific Intent of the Khmer Rouge Leaders to Destroy
the Vietnamese National Group

Currently, there is no specific international standard governing the rules of procedure and
evidence; therefore international criminal courts can take a liberal approach in determining what

89

See Kaelijeli at ¶ 153 supra note 69; Kayishema and Ruzindana at ¶ 161 supra note 80
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tabs 19 and 22].
90

See George William Mugwanya, THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
APPRAISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE UN TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA at 232 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 35].
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evidence is admissible in court, the general standard of admissibility requiring only that evidence
possess relevance and probative value.91 This liberal approach to the admissibility of evidence,
which has existed since the Nuremburg trials, establishes the importance of not only ensuring a
fair trial, but that individuals guilty of serious international crimes do not escape punishment.92
The language of the Nuremburg Charter, which states that the Nuremburg Tribunal should not be
limited by technical rules of evidence, has been followed by subsequent international criminal
courts.93
Both the ICTY and the ICTR refrain from placing wording in their statutes which would
substantially limit the admissibility of evidence, allowing courts to admit any relevant evidence
which is deemed to have probative value.94 The ICTY and the ICTR also resolve to review and
determine the admissibility of evidence on a case by case basis, assessing the evidence “in such a
way as will best favor a fair determination of the case and which is consistent with the spirit of
the Statute and the general principles of law.” 95 The Rome Statute acknowledges this broad
discretion, providing for international courts to independently determine what information has

91

See Steven R. Ratner, Jason S. Abrams and James L. Bischoff, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 289. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 42].
92

Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg (IMT), August 8, 1945, 82 UNTS
279 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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sufficient relevance and probative value to be admitted as evidence.96 In the ICTY, evidence of a
consistent pattern of conduct relevant to serious violations of international humanitarian law may
be admissible in the interest of justice.97
Since determining the specific intent of the accused often revolves in large part around
the scale of the atrocities committed and the widespread nature in which they were committed, it
is likely that the elimination of Cambodians identified as Vietnamese sympathizers will be
admissible as evidence that can aid in establishing the specific genocidal intent of the Khmer
Rouge. Also, since it is certain that testimony from members of the Vietnamese national group
will be unavailable, evidence by way of the Cambodians who were marked for elimination
because of their connections to the Vietnamese national group is not only relevant with probative
value, but crucial in bringing charges against the Khmer Rouge leaders for the genocide of the
Vietnamese.
C.

The Actus Reus of Genocide

While the drafters of the Genocide Convention intentionally created a narrow definition
of genocide, modern international criminal jurisprudence has shown a willingness to apply
expansive interpretations to the various physical elements of genocide. The specific intent
requirement still applies to each actus reus element of genocide, whether implicitly or explicitly.
The language used in the Genocide Convention to define the culpable acts and their requisite
mental states provides little clarity and has been subject to various interpretations over the past
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50 years.98 One view which has been widely agreed upon, however, is that the enumerated acts
must be aimed at the physical or biological destruction of a protected group.99 The physical acts
which constitute the crime of genocide are:
(a) Killing members of the group
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 100
The ECCC Statute repeats the language of Article II verbatim and while the Rome Statute
provides some clarity by including the provision defining the mental elements which apply to the
physical elements of genocide, most interpretations have come from previous case law.101
1.

The Systematic Elimination of Cambodian Citizens Identified as
Vietnamese Sympathizers as a Method of Causing Serious Mental
Harm to the Vietnamese.

Article II (b) of Genocide Convention states that genocide may be committed by
“causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a protected group,” but does not

See Schabas, THE ‘ODIOUS SCOURGE’ supra note 11 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
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specifically state the acts necessary to fulfill this element. 102 The ICTY, ICTR and ECCC
statutes, all of which repeat verbatim Article II the Genocide Convention, are also silent as to
which acts may cause serious bodily or mental harm.103 Although the language of the
Convention is silent as to what acts may constitute serious bodily or mental harm, there is
nothing in the language suggesting a limitation on the acts that may cause serious bodily or
mental harm.104
While decisions from courts in the ad hoc Tribunals suggest a trend in applying an
expansive interpretation to this element, the prosecution must still meet the demanding
requirement of proving specific intent of the accused.105 It also must be shown that the accused
intended to contribute toward the physical destruction of the protected group through inflicting
serious mental harm, necessitating that any analysis of this element be conducted on a case by
case basis. 106 In the first genocide trial after Nuremburg, the District Court of Israel held that
serious bodily or mental harm could be caused by “enslavement, starvation, deportation and
persecution…and by detention in ghettos, transit camps and concentration camps in conditions
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which were designed to cause their degradation, deprivation of their rights as human beings and
to suppress them and cause them inhumane suffering and torture.” 107
The ICTR has broadly construed ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ to encompass more than
just acts of torture and included inhumane or degrading treatment or persecution, holding that
rape and sexual violence may constitute genocide on both a physical and mental level.108 In
dealing with the systematic rape of Tutsi women, an ICTR Trial Chamber found this constituted
genocide “in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such.”109 The trial chamber
went on to say that the systematic rape of Tutsi women and girls was “part of the propaganda
campaign geared toward mobilizing the Hutu against the Tutsi, the Tutsi women were presented
as sexual objects….[s]exual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group –
destruction of spirit, the will to live, and of life itself.” 110
The ICTY has held that “the forced displacement of women, children, and elderly people
. . . may reach the requisite level of causing serious mental harm.” The court stated that when the
Bosnian Muslims who were forced to flee their homes in Srebrenica to escape the fighting, they
“boarded the buses without even being asked for their name. . . saw the smoke from their homes
being burned and knew this was not a temporary displacement for their immediate safety. Rather,
this displacement was a critical step in achieving the ultimate objective of the attack of the
107

Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, ¶ 199, District Court, 12
December 1961. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
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Srebrenica enclave.” 111 Referring to the massacre at Srebrenica, the court held that the Muslim
men who were executed as well as those who had survived suffered the serious bodily or mental
harm referred to in Article II (b). The fear of being captured, the fear for security of friends and
family and the trauma they endured when taken to execution sites by watching the execution of
friends and family all while waiting for their turn to be executed, are various examples the court
cited in support of its conclusion that the men at Srebrenica suffered serious mental harm.112
The line of reasoning used by the Akayesu court suggests that the elimination of
Cambodians who were identified as Vietnamese sympathizers may be used to satisfy the serious
or mental harm element of genocide. Certainly the surrounding facts are vastly different, but if
the elimination of sympathizers is substituted for the sexual violence as addressed by the ICTR,
the result of the violence as a step in the process of the destruction of the Vietnamese by
destroying “the spirit, the will to live and of life itself,” seems to apply to the Vietnamese
through the systematic destruction of the Cambodians, many of whom were spouses of the
remaining Vietnamese.
The facts and holding of Blagojević can be read to apply to the elimination of
Cambodians who were Vietnamese sympathizers in two ways. First, the elimination of the
Cambodians who sympathized with the Vietnamese was a critical step in achieving the complete
annihilation of the Vietnamese. Second, since the majority of the Vietnamese who remained in
Cambodia after 1975 were married to Cambodians, it is likely that many witnessed the execution
or torture of a spouse or child. In some cases, Khmer Rouge cadre ordered Cambodian husbands
Prosecutor v. Blagojević, ¶ 650, IT-02-60-T, Judgment of 17 January 2005 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
111

112
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to kill their Vietnamese wives.113 In the Eastern Zone in 1977, all Vietnamese were ordered to be
arrested and executed. Over 200 Vietnamese women were killed, along with their Khmer
husbands. All Khmer men who were not executed for having a Vietnamese wife were sent to
prison.114 The Vietnamese who witnessed the murder of a spouse or other family member were
in a situation very similar to the Muslim men who were murdered at Srebrenica, giving rise to
level of mental harm that the Blagojević court found to be genocidal. Furthermore, it is important
to note that the court in Blagojević did not require direct evidence of the serious mental harm
suffered by the Muslim men at Srebrenica; rather the court inferred this harm to be present by the
surrounding circumstances.115
2.

The Systematic Elimination of Cambodian Citizens Identified as
Vietnamese Sympathizers as a way to Deliberately Inflict Conditions
of Life on the Vietnamese that were Calculated to Bring About its
Physical Destruction.

Article II (c) of the Genocide Convention states that genocide may be committed by
“deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part,” and like Article II (b), is silent as to the specific conditions of
life which must be imposed upon a protected group in order to satisfy this element. Also like
Article II (b), the accused must intend to contribute toward the destruction of a protected group
by imposing such conditions of life; however unlike Article II (b), this element does not require
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proof of a result.116 The word ‘calculated’ suggests that the “imposition of conditions must be the
principal mechanism used to destroy the group, rather than some form of ill-treatment that
accompanies or is incidental to the crime.” 117
Case law from the ad hoc Tribunals provides some explanation as to what conditions of
life need to be imposed to rise to the level of genocide. However, the drafters of the Genocide
Convention may have been intentionally vague on this point, realizing the impossibility of
stating in advance all possible ‘conditions of life’ that could fall within the scope of this
article.118 The ICTR has given this element of genocide a somewhat broad interpretation, holding
that “all circumstances which will lead to a slow death,” or “methods of destruction by which the
perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their
physical destruction,” 119 specifically holding that rape, starvation, insufficient medical services
and living accommodations are conditions of life which may satisfy this element.120 The ICTY
has held that conditions of life created by detention or concentration camps are sufficient to
satisfy this requirement provided that conditions in these camps were “calculated to bring about
the physical destruction of the detainees, with the intent to destroy” part of a protected group. 121
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The Rome Statute of the ICC also gives this element of genocide an expansive interpretation,
stating that the term conditions of life “may include, but is not necessarily restricted to,
deliberate deprivations of resources indispensible for survival, such as food or medical services,
or systematic expulsions.” 122
Article II (c) of the Genocide Convention can be interpreted to apply to the elimination of
Cambodians marked as Vietnamese sympathizers under the broad interpretations applied by the
ICTY, the ICTR and the Rome Statute. By systematically eliminating the Cambodians who were
sympathetic to the Vietnamese, and who therefore stood in a better position to aid the
Vietnamese group compared to other Cambodians, the Khmer Rouge deliberately created
conditions of life for the Vietnamese that were calculated to bring about their physical
destruction. Regarding the intent of the Khmer Rouge to destroy the Vietnamese through
creating different conditions of life, it is important to remember that a significant number of
Cambodians who were identified as Vietnamese sympathizers were likely family members or
spouses of the Vietnamese. The elimination Vietnamese sympathizers can be read to fall within
the scope of Akayesu and Kayishema and Ruzindana as “methods of destruction by which the
perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their
physical destruction”123
Article II (c) also applies to the elimination of Cambodians marked as Vietnamese
sympathizers if interpreted in line with holdings from the ICTY stating that concentration or
prison camps are conditions of life which may satisfy this element. The infamous Tuol Sleng
122
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prison and torture center, or S-21, was the “purge apparatus” used by Khmer Rouge leaders to
elicit through torture confessions of suspected class enemies and their families.124 It shares many
similarities with the concentration camps referred to by the Eichmann court and the ICTY. In
1976, the same year the Khmer Rouge’s campaign against the Vietnamese likely became
genocidal, incarceration at S-21 increased dramatically, the total number of prisoners rising to
20,000 before the reign of the Khmer Rouge was over.125 If not executed summarily, anyone
considered to be a class enemy, including the husbands, wives, children and other family
members of the suspect, was at risk of being taken to the S-21 interrogation center for torture and
execution. Previously a high school, classrooms were converted to jail cells and lecture halls
transformed into torture chambers. The commander of the prison set aside specific days to kill
the different divisions of class enemies held in the prison: “one day the wives of ‘enemies;’
another day the children; a different day, factory workers.”126 The “confessions” elicited from
those suspected of being Vietnamese agents and sympathizers were considered to be
overwhelming evidence of the need to eradicate all traces of Vietnam from Cambodia.127 The
conditions at S-21 clearly fall within what the Sikirica court found as conditions of life sufficient
to satisfy this requirement, S-21 was obviously “calculated to bring about the physical
destruction of the detainees, with the intent to destroy” part of a protected group.
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3.

The Systematic Elimination of Cambodian Citizens Identified as Vietnamese
Sympathizers as a way of Imposing Measures Intended to Prevent Births
within the Group.

Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention states that genocide may be committed by
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and also like Articles II (b) and
(c), is silent as to the acts which may satisfy this element of genocide. Unlike Articles II (b) and
(c), however, Article II (d) does not demand that the prevention of births in a group be calculated
to destroy the group in whole or in part, only that the perpetrator intended to prevent births.128 In
the Eichmann trial, the Israeli District Court convicted Eichmann for imposing measures
intended to prevent births among the Jews even though it found that preventing births was not an
integral part of the “final solution.”129
Both the ICTY and ICTR have expanded on the Eichmann interpretation of this element
and, like the other physical elements of genocide discussed in this memorandum, jurisprudence
from these tribunals indicates a willingness to apply an expansive method of interpretation to this
element. The ICTY has held that rape and sexual violence can be committed with the intent to
alter the ethnic identity of the protected group. 130 The ICTR in particular has applied a broad and
interpretation to Article II (d), holding that that acts of rape, sterilization, sexual mutilation,
forced birth control, separation of sexes, and impregnation to ensure that a child of the
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perpetrators group is born as acts which can satisfy this element.131 In explaining its rationale for
applying such an expansive interpretation to this element, the ICTR has held that there are many
acts which can prevent births within a group. Rape, for example, may not only physically prevent
the victim from procreating, but may cause such mental trauma that the victim refuses to have
sex and, ultimately, children.132
Since most of the Vietnamese who remained in Cambodia after 1975 were likely spouses
of Cambodian citizens, the elimination of Cambodians who had Vietnamese spouses necessarily
prevented births within the Vietnamese national group. The ICTR’s expansive interpretation of
Article II (d) can be applied to torture methods employed at S-21 and other interrogation center
regarding the elimination of Cambodian citizens who were Vietnamese in two ways. First, the
torture methods at S-21 included the sexual mutilation of female inmates,133 a method
specifically stated by the ICTR as a way to satisfy this element of genocide. Second, if female
inmates were mothers, they were forced to watch the torture and execution of their children.134
While being forced to watch the torture and execution of a child is not sexual violence per se, the
mental trauma certainly endured by these women is analogous to the kind described in Akayesu
and Rutaganda. Additionally, the mental trauma which likely stemmed from witnessing the

131

See Prosecutor v. Musema, ¶ 158, ICTR -96-13-T, Judgment of 27 January 2000; Rutaganda
at ¶ 53 supra note 53 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tabs 27 and 28].
132

See Akayesu at ¶ 508 supra note 23; Rutaganda at ¶ 53 supra note 53 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tabs 14 and 28].
133

Becker, WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER at 224 supra note 51 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 34].
134

Id.
38

Adrienne Cavender
International War Crimes Lab
Fall 2009

torture or execution of a spouse is also analogous to the kind of harm referred to in Akayesu and
Rutaganda.

IV.

CONCLUSION
Since using the elimination of one group of people as a means for bringing genocide

charges against another has not been formally addressed in international jurisprudence, there
exists no case law which speaks directly to this point. However, the willingness of previous ad
hoc tribunals to apply various and often expansive interpretations to the definition of genocide
and its accompanying elements suggests that the elimination of Cambodian citizens identified
Vietnamese sympathizers can be used as grounds for charging the Khmer Rouge leaders with
genocide of the Vietnamese.
The elimination of Cambodians identified as Vietnamese sympathizers appears to be
most effective in establishing the requisite mental state of genocide. The elimination of
Cambodians identified as Vietnamese sympathizers provides direct and circumstantial evidence
of the specific intent of the Khmer Rouge leaders to destroy the Vietnamese. The existence of
state plans and policies directed at the elimination of the Vietnamese coupled with the
surrounding circumstances and widespread nature with which the atrocities occurred provide
compelling evidence of the specific genocidal intent of the Khmer Rouge. Considering the wide
range of discretion which international tribunals have when determining what information is
admissible as evidence, it is likely that the elimination of Vietnamese sympathizers will fall
within the ‘with relevance and probative value’ standard used to govern evidence admissibility.
Additionally, the wide range of case law from the ad hoc Tribunals addressing the possible
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methods of negating the mens rea of genocide, suggests that attempts to negate the specific intent
of the Khmer Rouge leaders could be sufficiently rebutted if raised.
The elimination of Cambodians identified as Vietnamese sympathizers also appears to be
relevant to establishing the actus reus elements of genocide stated in Article II (b), (c), and (d)
of the Genocide Convention. It seems that the elimination of Cambodian citizens identified as
Vietnamese sympathizers is the most applicable to Article II (b) which states that genocide may
be committed by causing serious bodily or mental harm particularly since most Vietnamese
sympathizers were spouses of Vietnamese. While both the ICTY and the ICTR apply expansive
methods of interpretation to this element, the elimination of Cambodians identified as
Vietnamese sympathizers is most similar to specific fact patterns from the ICTY case law. The
elimination of Vietnamese sympathizers can also be interpreted to satisfy Article II (c)
destructive conditions of life, albeit with more difficulty than the satisfaction of Article II (b).
Finally, the elimination of Vietnamese sympathizers may also be used to satisfy the physical
element stated in Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention. Through establishing the requisite
mental state of genocide in addition to satisfying the physical elements stated in Article II (b),
(c), and (d) of the Genocide Convention, the elimination of Vietnamese sympathizers becomes
an integral part of the case against the Khmer Rouge leaders for the genocide of the Vietnamese.
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